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‘THE POWER OF THE UNAIDED INDIVIDUAL MIND IS HIGHLY OVERRATED’1 
The question of what constitutes creative genius remains controversial. Barzun (1989) 
would argue that exceptional thinking drives the work of Leonardo or Picasso. Sternberg 
(1996, p. 353) asked: “why was Mozart so damn good?” and his answer discounts prac-
tice and acquired skills in favour of innate talent. Weisberg (2006) in turn would argue 
that more prosaic cognitive processes underlie creative achievements, even for those 
unanimously labelled genius. Whether the answers are couched in terms of exceptional 
1 Fischer, Giaccardi, Eden, Sugimoto and Ye (2005, p. 485).  
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processes, innate talent or acquired skills, mainstream cognitive psychology has the ten-
dency to cast genius as the product of internal cognitive processes (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1999, Glăveanu, 2015). We argue that a focus on the individual has come at the expense 
of a consideration of the product by which the genius is defined, and the extent to which 
that product is the result of personal, historical and socio-cultural forces. In contrast to the 
folk concept of a genius as a person who is ‘other’ and at odds with his or her environ-
ment and socio-cultural zeitgeist (Montuori & Purser, 1995), we suggest that even the 
most creative geniuses are more accurately seen as an emergent product of the dynamic 
relationship between the creator and the surrounding socio-cultural milieu. Further the 
contribution of the individual to these acts of creativity may be considerably smaller than 
the emphasis of much of contemporary psychological investigation suggests. 
Broadening the scope of research into the ontological locus for genius beyond the 
individual brain and/or the personality of the creator encourages an entirely different set 
of research questions, seeking answers in terms of processes distributed across, and 
constrained by, time, society, others and the surrounding environment. In this respect, an 
analysis of William Shakespeare’s creative genius would be particularly fruitful. Questions 
of subjective value in assessing both creativity and genius notwithstanding, Shakespeare 
is widely considered to be a creative genius: ‘it is as close to a fact as we are ever likely 
to get in aesthetics’ (Bate, 1997, p. 157). Simonton describes him as the ‘prototypical lit-
erary genius’ (Simonton, 1998, p. 168) and bemoans the lack of psychological investiga-
tion into his work. Bate (1997, p. 163) argues that the Romantic idea of genius ‘was a cat-
egory invented in order to account for what was peculiar about Shakespeare’. This Ro-
mantic view of Shakespeare has come to dominate folk ideas of ‘the Bard’. A balding 
man holding a quill, the creativity solely a result of internal workings. In contemporary folk 
psychology, Shakespeare and genius are closely aligned. However, we hope to demon-
strate that the drama for which Shakespeare is best known cannot be disentangled from 
the prevailing artistic currents and collaborations, nor can its novelty be appreciated with-
out understanding the past from which it arose. This, in turn, will suggest a broadening of 
the scope beyond the narrow Romantic concept of genius which Shakespeare is so often 
called upon to illustrate. 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINITION 
In contemporary definitions geniuses are outliers. However, the notion of genius as 
‘extraordinary intellectual power especially as manifested in creative activity’2 is relatively 
modern and arose from the Romantics; indeed, the use of genius as an adjective is often 
applied anachronistically in historical case studies (Bone, 1989). The original idea of geni-
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us was a notably external phenomenon; genius was a gift from the Muses. Yet, as the 
word developed, genius changed from an external appendage (something someone had) 
to an internal state (something someone is; Glăveanu, 2010). The claims that creativity 
either comes from the Muses or a specific, as yet undiscovered, part of the brain are 
practically interchangeable. Both ideas reflect an adherence to a mythology of sole, fixed 
causes that are centred on the individual, and both are equally useful in generating full 
explanations of genius. In other words, it is as useful to suggest Shakespeare was 
a great tragedian because he had a difference in a certain brain region as because he 
was inspired by Melpomene. This is a circular argument that restricts deeper investigation 
of what the creator did by focusing on what he was. Creating is an action-driven process 
that unfolds over space and time, shaped by a complex array of factors and forces, many 
originating outside the creator; creativity is not the product of a stable set of features in-
herent to the creator. 
At the heart of both of these definitions and others, however, is the notion of an indi-
vidual doing creating something novel and worthy (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Even systemic 
views on creativity, such as that formulated by Csikszentmihalyi (see Csikszentmihalyi, 
2015, for a collection of essays on his Systems model, especially Csikszentmihalyi, 1998) 
discuss how the act becomes valued as creative through reference to the intersections be-
tween the triad of the field, the domain and the individual: ‘The creative process involves the 
generation of a novel creative product by the individual, the evaluation of the product by the 
ﬁeld, and the retention of selected products by addition to the domain’ (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Sawyer 1995, p. 78, emphasis added). In this view what is considered creative is seen as a 
reflection of wider socio-cultural trends that shape acceptance but, crucially, the product is 
generated by the individual - in Simonton’s words, ‘the individual embodies […] the locus of 
the cognitive processes that generate creative ideas’ (Simonton, 2010, p. 160). In this mod-
el, a creative act is the product of both individual contribution and societal approbation of 
that contribution. As creativity is defined by a change in the domain, the domain is an inte-
gral part in constituting that act as creative (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). However, we argue 
for a stronger place for the domain rather than addressing it as ‘independent lay-
er’ (Malafouris, 2008, p. 1997). We suggest that such socio-cultural trends also shape the 
creative act rather than just react to it; that the entanglement of the external and the internal 
happens at various moments in the creative timeline.  
ENTANGLED AGENCY 
The full implications of Csikszentmihalyi’s analysis and model of creativity for the individu-
al’s agency in creativity deserve exploration. As Glăveanu (2010) also suggests, the mod-
Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications 5(1) 2018 
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el for a collective creativity may be ‘derailed’ (p. 90) if we have an incomplete vision of the 
social and cultural milieu. Rather, Csikszentmilhalyi’s definitions of domain and field can 
be extended from their conceptualisation as a controlling influence on the individual’s cre-
ative output to being intrinsically involved in it. We would broaden Csikszentmihalyi’s mod-
el along the lines of Glăveanu’s suggestions, so that the field becomes the ‘others’ and the 
domain, ‘pre-existing culture and artefacts’ (Glăveanu, 2010, p. 87). Further, we would 
suggest that the generator of the ideas, the individual, is better reconceptualised as multi-
ple. These triadic elements are recast to encompass all that are involved in the production 
of the creative act. Such a reconceptualization becomes particularly important when we 
consider the work of Shakespeare because at the time of Shakespeare’s work, creativity 
was not equated with an individual and personal ownership of creative works was fluid. 
Wider society does not just validate creativity but is directly involved in its produc-
tion through language, concepts, possibilities or even direct interpersonal acknowledged 
and unacknowledged collaboration (Glăveanu, 2015). The cognitive locus for creativity is 
therefore more accurately considered as distributed across various domains: the individu-
al, sociocultural forces, historical events, the available materials and a non-negligible 
dose of serendipity. This is not to suggest that individual differences in talent do not exist, 
but rather that they may not be the greatest driver of creative genius, or at least success-
ful creative genius. As counter-intuitive as this position appears, it is supported by empiri-
cal longitudinal studies of artistic talent such as Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer’s 
(1993) analysis of the role of effortful and deliberate practise in musical expertise. Addi-
tionally, Csikszentmihalyi, Getzels, and Kahn’s (1984) report on artists indicates that suc-
cess as a genius was not determined by artistic talent but rather by an understanding of 
the field of the artwork.  
There is a branch of creativity research which broadens the field beyond methodo-
logical individualism and encourages us to view the creative genius as situated within 
a time and an environment. Csikszentmihalyi’s work dethroning the individual to merely one 
part of the triad is the most well accepted example of this and it is now common to refer to 
his three aspects in any consideration of creativity. Simonton (1998; 2004)  
developed a quantitative programme which uncovers the influence of historical events  
on creativity. Glăveanu’s (2010) survey of the current state of creativity studies poses 
a harder challenge to reductionism in the study of creativity and the subsequent model of 
cultural framework expounded in that paper relocates all levels of creativity at a community 
and external level. As Montuori and Purser (1995) suggest, psychology considers itself as 
the study of individuals and resists broadening the definition beyond this. Frameworks such 
as these allow us to examine human behaviour when it is both situated and active. 
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THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 
In the main, thinking happens outside the fMRI scanner or the laboratory and an explana-
tion of creativity will be fundamentally unsatisfactory if it ignores external factors that have 
not only contributed to the acts considered genius, but whose effect may be significantly 
greater than the properties of the individual. Creativity does not happen inside people's 
heads, but in the interaction between a person's thoughts and a socio-cultural context, 
and this interaction produces a creative act beyond the limits of the constraints of each 
part (Engeström, 2001). The ontology of creativity is not in terms of a feature or element 
possessed to various degrees by some. Creativity is not a within property, it is an in-
between process (to adapt Malafouris, 2015): it is a property of “the relational space” that 
results from engaging with “the social, cultural and material environment” (Glăveanu, 
2014, p. 38). A more comprehensive, and therefore more accurate, analysis would need 
to consider the role of the whole system in the production of the creative product, not just 
its validation as creative. Furthermore, the very concept of individual genius is predicated 
on a society which has a strong sense of the self as individual and presupposes a culture 
in which individual achievement is celebrated and idealised.  
Kearney (1988) notes that the original paradigm of the art was theocratic and the 
artist was anonymous; art was a medium for the glory of God. However, ‘the modern 
movements of Renaissance, Romantic and Existentialist humanism replaced the theo-
centric paradigm, the mimetic craftsman, with the anthropocentric paradigm of the original 
inventor’ (Kearney, 1988, p. 12). The identification of an artist with their creative product 
is not a necessity but a reflection of cultural norms. This observation is echoed by 
Glăveanu who suggests that the He-paradigm of creativity arose in the Renaissance; 
here creativity is associated with individuality and outstanding naturally endowed ability 
whether that endowment is from a celestial source or from the biological makeup of ge-
netic inheritance (Glăveanu, 2010). This suggests that the central place of the individual 
in creativity is culturally contingent. Recognising this contingency forces a perspective 
shift that sits uncomfortably with current models but that is also necessary to untangle the 
full creative process. 
Shakespeare as a creative individual is surprisingly underrepresented in the histor-
ical record. The few biographical details of his life relate mainly to his business dealings 
and there is little contemporary evidence about his creative output. Indeed, ‘we have no 
idea what Shakespeare thought on any question’ (Nuttal, 2007, p. 1). Therefore, what we 
have left to analyse is the extant works. In the absence of biographical details, intrapsy-
chic explanations of Shakespeare’s creativity become more problematic for psycholo-
Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications 5(1) 2018 
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gists. Unlike Einstein (Men et al, 2014), we do not have access to his physical brain nor 
do we have the letters, diaries and autobiographies that are frequently used in psychobi-
ographies (see for example Chapters 6 [on Hardy and Ramanujan] and 7 [on Mozart] 
in Steptoe, 1998). In the case of Shakespeare, we are left with the product instead of the 
producer, forcing us to invert the traditional order of examination in cognitive psychology 
which focuses on the internal characteristics of the individual. Simonton recognises this 
dilemma with regards to Shakespeare and uses historiometric analysis to assess which 
aspects of form and content influence the plays’ popularity as well as assessing how 
these intersect with historical events (Simonton, Taylor, & Cassandro, 1998; Simonton, 
2004). While acknowledging the importance of external historical events on the finished 
product and of stylistic characteristics to an analysis of quality, this paper foregrounds the 
collaborative nature of Shakespeare’s creativity, emphasising its dependence on the dia-
logue with pre-existing and contemporary creativity.  
There are various limitations to the process of reverse engineering the idea of ge-
nius and creativity from biographical examples. These range from the practical need 
to find sufficiently robust and reliable evidence, to the risk of confirmation bias in selecting 
the genius; we are examining an artist or scientist or playwright who is an acknowledged 
genius often without recognising the key role of that acknowledgement in constituting 
the genius of the person. In other words, the very selection of the subjects for study pos-
sibly tells us more about the culture that has coronated these geniuses than the inner 
workings of those geniuses themselves. Further, the bidirectionality of the correlation be-
tween the domain and the creative act itself is rarely examined - not only does the do-
main approve the creative act, but the creative act can influence the domain. The interac-
tion between domain and individual is reciprocal and hetereoscalar. Disentangling such 
circular relations in historical case studies is impossible because of our anachronistic 
vantage point. However, we can highlight certain salient points. Not only was Shake-
speare situated in a particularly fertile time in the history of dramatic arts, he was also 
trained to consciously situate himself in past tradition. As T.S. Eliot (1919; 1982) argues, 
the work of a poet (or any creative artist) is in a bidirectional dialogue with preceding work 
and any future work. These ideas from literary criticism echo ideas in cognitive science 
that creative acts do not spring from nowhere but are instead extensions of previous 
thoughts; both Eliot (1919) and Weisberg (1986, 1993) see creativity as an incremental 
building on the past. These standpoints are in opposition to the folk psychology of a lone 
creative genius working in isolation. Indeed, Weisberg’s overall thesis aims to dismantle 
the myth of the ‘lone genius’ and demonstrate that works of great scientific or artistic cre-
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ativity emerge from incremental changes in the pre-existing domain and cannot be under-
stood in isolation from their past.  
IMITATIO 
There are close linguistic and content parallels between Shakespeare and his sources (see 
Muir, 2014, for a detailed analysis of the relationship between the plays and their sources). 
Perhaps, the most well, known is that of the similarity of Enobarbus’ description of Cleopat-
ra on her barge in Anthony and Cleopatra to the description of the same Egyptian queen in 
Thomas North’s 1579 translation of Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. Consider for example: 
North: And now for the person of herself: she was laid under a pavilion of 
cloth of gold of tissue, apparelled and attired like the goddess Venus, common-
ly drawn in picture. (Plutarch, 1909, p. 38) 
Shakespeare: For her own person/It beggared all description. She did lie/in 
her pavilion, cloth-of-gold of tissue/ o’erpicturing that Venus where we see/the 
fancy outwork nature. (Shakespeare, 1997, 2:2. 203-207) 
 However, these are not cases of plagiarism in a modern sense of text-theft. Although 
modern attribution scholars may use plagiarism checkers to assess similarities between 
texts, this textual borrowing and inspiration was considered neither plagiarism nor cheat-
ing. Such ideas of text-theft imply an ownership of words and phrases which can only 
arise in a society which sees the creative act as belonging to its creator. By contrast, hu-
manist education in the tradition of Erasmus encouraged this word/phrase borrowing, 
teaching pupils to take phrases from classical works and keep them in a notebook ready 
to reuse in their own writing (Crane, 2014). This rhetorical method of imitatio was a con-
scious placing of oneself within a classical tradition and was much admired as a mark 
of scholarly learning. Thus, it is important to note that the creative genius of Shakespeare 
was not only influenced by the sources but also constrained by the cultural limits on what 
constituted creative genius.  
To become a great Early Modern literary figure, one was obliged to enter a dialogue 
with the past. Montuori and Purser (1995) note that in our modern society we worry that 
learning by heart will undermine creativity (in their case, jazz soloists) but under the six-
teenth century humanist schooling system, creativity was considered to be enhanced by 
this thorough knowledge of, and dialogue with, classic texts. Indeed, for Renaissance hu-
manist scholars, all art was imitation (Clare, 2014) which echoes the Early Modern trans-
lator John Florio’s (1603) borrowing from Ecclesiastes that ‘there is nothing new under 
the sunne’ (p. 12). Novelty in the strict sense of the word was impossible within this tradi-
tion. There was no concept of creativity as arising ex nihilo from a lone and untutored ge-
Creativity. Theories – Research – Applications 5(1) 2018 
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nius. In this way, the domain shapes the creative product by valuing effortful work  
anchored in the past.  
Moreover, the past becomes a co-author of the work, providing not only plot and char-
acters but elements of linguistics style. Bate (1997, p. 103) writes that, ‘nearly all Shake-
speare’s plays are rewritings of one kind or another. His works were in all sorts of respects 
prewritten by others, just as they have been subsequently rewritten by others.’ Shake-
speare’s genius is contingent on collaborations with the past, present and future. This bor-
rowing from, and reworking of, sources is evident throughout all his plays whether con-
scious or unconscious (Muir, 2014). Thus, to suggest that Shakespeare’s genius arose ex 
nihilo would be to do so against considerable evidence to the contrary. Rather, as well as 
informing and creating the foundation for Shakespeare’s work, the past had an active input 
into it allowing him to exceed the necessary limitations of one individual. If we look again at 
the passage from Anthony and Cleopatra we can see that whereas in North, Cleopatra was 
‘attired like the goddess Venus, commonly drawn in picture’, in Shakespeare she was 
‘o’erpicturing that Venus’. Here Shakespeare is consciously building on his source and cre-
ating a novel metaphor crucially rooted in, and dependent, on that source.  
Shakespeare’s creative genius arises not solely from his own words, but from the in-
terplay between his text and its source; it is both reliant on and surpasses the past. 
Shakespeare’s audience would have been aware of the classical references. In these 
productions, understanding arose in a collaborative space and meaning was contingent 
on an audience’s understanding of these classical moments incorporated in the present. 
As well as changing the way the plays were written and performed, humanist education 
practices changed the way the audience saw the play. Returning to Csikszentmihalyi’s 
argument that a creative product is found at the intersection of individual, domain and 
field, with the spread of Erasmusian pedagogy, we see a demonstration of domain and 
field - the dialogue with the past shaped the domain and the product that was produced 
as well as the reaction to it.  
COLLABORATIVE AND CONTINGENT CREATIVITY 
Shakespeare’s creativity was not just rooted in the past. A close analysis of the domain 
and field of Early Modern drama will indicate just how fertile a ground it was for the types 
of play that proliferated in that period. Drama of all periods is, by its very nature, a collab-
orative genre which goes beyond the dialogue between reader and writer that emerges in 
other forms of fiction. A play is shaped by the writer, director and actors, and the final 
product is contingent on the actions of this broad, interlinked, constituency. This can be 
clearly evidenced by the revivals and reconceptualization of not only Early Modern drama 
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but even contemporary plays which are reimagined to reflect contemporary events. Addi-
tionally, a play is also reconstituted in every performance with the addition of the audi-
ence. The plays we read, even the plays we see performed in the present, are not the 
plays that Shakespeare wrote. Those plays as artefacts were lost when they ended; they 
had a singular existence, captured by a set of contingent parameters. Even a scant 
knowledge of the ways the plays were turned from performed piece to printed text from the 
writer’s draft, some memorisation and then interventions from the printers, undermines the 
relationship between the play and the written text (see Petersen, 2016; Dahl, 2016). 
 Moreover, just as there have been few modern productions that have completely 
respected the text, it seems unlikely that contemporary productions would have been any 
more respectful. This is what Potter (2014, p. 468) calls the ‘contingent side of [Shakes-
peare’s] theater’, suggesting that the multiplicity of performances is a reflection of the 
text’s flexibility. It is not only conceivable but probable that the play scripts we have inher-
ited from the quartos and the folios refer to an actual play that was never performed as 
written. It is this that Williams (2018, p. 134) hones in on when he suggests that the plays 
we have received are not exact; that any evidence ‘is not made up of chemical formulae 
but of the messy strugglings of human creativity’. When we speak about the Shake-
speare’s dramatic genius, Shakespeare here does not signify the individual that could be 
subjected to neuroscientific tests or psychometric profiling; instead it is a shorthand for 
the constitutive elements of the performance enacted by actors, directors and spectators.  
The modern desire to attribute authorship to one sole individual and grant him own-
ership of the text is anachronistic when applied to the plays of the Shakespearean stage. 
Shakespeare’s work was shaped by both friendly and rival sources and playwrights. In-
deed, Masten (1997, p. 32) writes that ‘collaboration was the Renaissance English thea-
tre’s dominant mode of textual reproduction’. It is notable that an entire field of study has 
arisen to discuss the authorship of the plays, disentangling the phraseology and words 
that can be attributed to different single authors from this period. Collaborations are woven 
in to the very fabric of the texts we have inherited. Jowett (2013, p. 88) lists the dramatists 
with whom computational stylistics would suggest Shakespeare worked:  
‘Christopher Marlowe, George Peele, Henry Chettle, Thomas Dekker, Thom-
as Heywood, Thomas Middleton, George Wilkins and John Fletcher. If he re-
vised The Spanish Tragedy, he worked on a play that was also revised by 
Ben Jonson. The two posthumous adaptations [Macbeth and Measure for 
Measure] were undertaken by Middleton’  
 This collaboration was both conscious and unconscious. Shakespeare was in a tran-
sitional period in relation to both the dramatic form and the idea of ownership of a play-
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texts. Once a text was bought it was held by the playing company that performed it and 
altered by the writers of that company so that each text became a palimpsest of sorts.  
Beyond deliberate collaboration, either in concert with the main writer or a ‘non-
consensual form of collaboration’ (Jowett, 2013, p. 90), Shakespeare’s work was marked 
by informal collaboration. This intertextuality was not the deliberate, conscious word bor-
rowings of imitatio, rather a rich idiolect of the friends and rivals that would have informed 
the written and performed work. Marlowe and Shakespeare’s influence on each other 
(until the former’s dramatic death) is stark enough that there are still many that are con-
vinced that Marlowe is the better candidate for authorship of the plays commonly attribut-
ed to Shakespeare. Clare (2014, p. 20) refers to this intertextuality as ‘dynamic exchange’ 
and suggests a critical methodology which ‘does not privilege the agency of the play-
wright, the reader/auditor, or the text itself’. Intertextuality is a constituent part of the dra-
ma itself and the individual as described by Csikszentmihalyi (1998) cannot easily be dis-
entangled from those in his immediate social circle. For this reason, this part of the crea-
tive triad is best considered as multiple.  
The collaborations were not only with other playwrights but also with directors and 
actors. Mardock and Rasmussen (2013) demonstrate that an analysis of love comedies 
of the 1590s suggests that there were two boy actors playing female parts - one tall and 
fair and one short and dark - given the number of female pairings in plays from this period 
which have these characteristics. Moreover, they argue that the excision of Innogen from 
Much Ado About Nothing which ‘critics usually explain […] in terms of literary craft’  
(p. 114) instead reflects the more practical considerations of casting for a company that 
had no more than four boy actors. Yet, this practical choice shaped the relationship be-
tween Beatrice and Hero and possibly enhanced its dramatic effectiveness. The change 
here that wrought interesting dramatic tensions in female relationships were potentially 
made for practical reasons rather than reflecting authorial intent. 
Also, particularly important was the actor Robert Burbage, of whom Wells (2006, 
p. 43) writes ‘[his] special talents undoubtedly did much to influence Shakespeare’s 
choice of materials for plays and his characterisation of many leading roles’. This intimate 
knowledge that Shakespeare had of the actors in his company and his close, friendly re-
lations with them undermine the attribution of these texts to a sole literary genius; the 
plays grew in the space between the actors and the playwright. That ‘no other dramatist 
of the period had so long and close and relationship with a single acting company’ (Wells, 
2006, p. 5) may even be a far greater explanation of Shakespeare’s genius than any in-
trapsychic one. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since Barthes (1977; 1994) killed off the author, literary criticism has battled with how much 
of the writer to put in the text and how to reconcile the sterility of deconstructionism with the 
production of living texts by a living author. The New Historicists have firmly situated literary 
texts in the time and space in which they were written, and the writer is often reduced to 
a conduit for contemporaneous political forces (see Nuttall, 2007). Mainstream cognitive 
psychology, on the other hand, resists considering human behaviour and products as any-
thing other than the actions of a decontextualized fully agentic individual. This assumes 
a fixed, inviolable and immutable unit with inputs and outputs that can be operationalised. 
It is clearly discomforting and unsatisfactory to go to the furthest extreme and erase 
human agency and individual differences from the creative process (see March, 2017, for 
a phenomenological description of the anxiety evoked by losing agency in creativity). Fur-
thermore, it still does not explain all the factors in extreme outliers. After all, however 
scant the biographical evidence, there was a playwright called Shakespeare whose influ-
ence was immense, and it could be argued that a discussion such as the above dismiss-
es the importance of his own agency in creating his work. This tension between individual 
and socio-cultural contribution is described by Glăveanu as a root paradox in creativity 
(Glăveanu, 2018).  
Nevertheless, a recognition that an individual writer does not write in isolation 
seems particularly important for an analysis of the works of Shakespeare. While our brief 
case study of Shakespeare’s creativity is anchored in terms of a set of historical and cul-
tural coordinates, we believe the analysis showcases the heuristic value of framing onto-
logical questions about creativity and genius in relational terms which may be fruitfully 
applied to other outputs or persons deemed creative. Current conceptualisations of crea-
tivity assume a pure and individual author, rather than a writer whose thinking and crea-
tivity was contingent on, and shaped by, heteroscalar forces and contemporary creative 
energies and synergies. While his genius must occur in the space beyond the overlap  
of socio-cultural forces, it is still important to assess the overlap because this may be 
larger than we initially assume. Analysis of Shakespeare’s style at the microscopic level 
using statistical stylistic markers suggests that ‘his work is unusual if anything for its con-
stant closeness to the average use of words at the time.’ (Rosso, Craig, & Moscato, 
2009, p. 925); perhaps even his mundanity is what makes him so appealing. This would 
seem to support Glăveanu’s suggestion that the paradox can be resolved by 
an ‘immersed detachment’ in which the creator is ‘well-connected to his or her society 
or culture’ (Glăveanu, 2018, p.3).  
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Indeed, as we examine more closely the historical appeal of Shakespeare, and the 
validation of the field, it is the openness (Eco, 1962; 1989) of his work which allows it to 
be manipulated in such a way as to provide a vehicle for subsequent generations to pro-
ject their own anxieties and preoccupations. Shakespeare’s literary reputation was forged 
by others, rather than himself, and the biography of the creator is notoriously slippery 
enough to allow other figures to be considered as authorship candidates. So, it is, per-
haps, Shakespeare’s very absence as a creative individual that enables us to endow him 
with such genius. 
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